Rizvan Huseynov. Big Game in Transcaucasia
Rizvan Huseynov is a senior researcher at the Institute of Law and Human Rights of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, and since 2014, the director of the Center for Caucasus History. Since 2015, he has been an associate professor at the UNESCO Department for Comparative Studies of Spiritual Traditions, Specific Cultures, and Interreligious Dialogue in the North Caucasus. He is also the author of the TV project “Accusations of History” and several films.
This part of the text is a retrospective of the author’s speech at the round table “The Big Game in Transcaucasia” held a year ago in Moscow on September 4, 2023 at the “Tsargrad” Institute, with the participation of experts from different countries. The author kindly allowed Atlantis Org to create an opinion piece based on his speech during discussions with other experts. We strongly recommend that you read the first part of The Big Game in Transcaucasia before reading this piece.
Rizvan Huseynov. Big Game in Transcaucasia
Translated into English by https://theatlantis.org/
The term “Transcaucasia” (Zakavkaz’ye) is considered inappropriate in contemporary contexts, as the region it refers to has not existed as a distinct political entity for over 30 years. Furthermore, the term can lead to significant misunderstandings. For instance, in the case of Azerbaijan, “Transcaucasia” is understood to refer to a region within the Russian Federation, specifically the northern part of the Caucasus, rather than the South Caucasus region.
Since 2011–2012, with the start of the “Arab Spring,” it became clear that certain Western powers, perhaps indirectly, have been disrupting the traditional logistics, infrastructure, and energy flows of oil and gas that were established during colonial times, dating back to World War II or even earlier.
It became evident that the emerging geopolitical, energy, and transit vacuum would inevitably be filled. There were significant expectations that Russia would be able to occupy this space and that the newly developing Eurasian logistics network would play a critical role in shaping a new global order.
In today’s world, control over transit routes, energy flows, logistics, and land routes is becoming the foundation of future political and economic power. While this topic is certainly open to debate, it’s clear that the current struggle isn’t for raw materials, which have long been divided among corporations, but for control over logistics and transport routes. This includes transit, energy resources like oil and gas, and electricity. Additionally, water—especially drinking water—is increasingly becoming a serious cause of conflict. Traditional transportation routes, such as railways and road networks, are also playing a crucial role. The restoration of old land routes and the creation of new ones across Eurasia are being supported by Azerbaijan and its partners, primarily Turkey, Israel, and to some extent the United Kingdom, although the latter has its own specific interests.
However, there are several countries that seek to preserve the old logistical routes that have developed over the past 200 years, starting with the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 and the arrival of Imperial Russia in the South Caucasus. At that time, a logistics system was established, oriented toward the interests of maritime powers. However, this was not solely Russia’s doing—these were the collective interests of Western countries, which is no secret. The South Caucasus turned into a kind of depot, a logistical dead end, a final station from which goods and services did not move further south or west. Instead, our region was integrated into a new, then Eurocentric Atlanticist logistics system, in which Imperial Russia also played an important role.
Yet, for many centuries, the South Caucasus was a significant junction, a logistical hub that today is often referred to as “East-West” and “North-South” — two major projects aimed at restoring the logistics that were lost two or three centuries ago. The “East-West” route (one of the traditional Silk Road lines) spanned a significant portion of Eurasia, from China through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Iran, and Turkey, reaching the Mediterranean and Europe. The “North-South” route extended from Northern Europe, the Baltic, and Russia along the Volga River through cities such as Kazan, Astrakhan, and Derbent, then through Azerbaijan and Iran to the Persian Gulf, with branches leading to Arabia and India. Both of these routes converged in Azerbaijan.
However, there are several countries that wish to preserve the existing logistics and trade routes—those that have been developed over the past 200 years, starting with the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 and the arrival of Tsarist Russia in the South Caucasus region. During that time, a logistics system was established, rooted in the interests of the maritime powers. Yet, this was not solely Russia’s doing; it reflected the collective interests of Western nations, a fact that cannot be denied. The South Caucasus became a kind of depot, a logistical dead end—an endpoint from which goods and services no longer moved southward or westward. Instead, our region was integrated into the then-new Eurocentric Atlanticist logistics system, in which Tsarist Russia played a significant role.
Yet, for centuries before this, the South Caucasus had been a crucial crossroads, a logistical hub that today is often referred to as the “East-West” and “North-South” routes—two major projects aimed at restoring the logistics pathways that had been dismantled two or three centuries ago. The “East-West” route (a branch of the traditional Silk Road) spanned a vast portion of Eurasia, stretching from China through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, Iran, and Turkey, all the way to the Mediterranean and Europe. The “North-South” route began in Northern Europe, the Baltic region, and Russia, following the Volga River through cities like Kazan, Astrakhan, and Derbent, down to Azerbaijan, and from there through Iran to the Persian Gulf, with branches extending into Arabia and India. Both of these routes converged in Azerbaijan.
All of this was shut down after Tsarist Russia entered the region with its new Eurocentric logistics philosophy. Under Peter the Great, a window to Europe was opened for the young Russian state, a window that remained relevant for the last 300 years. My “alarmism” over the past 15 years stemmed from the fact that Russia was missing the opportunity to calmly prepare for what is happening in the world today. Unfortunately, Russia did not take that opportunity. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and its allies and partners did not waste time. This, of course, was met with mixed reactions, including within the Russian expert and media circles. Hence, the frequent claims and predictions from numerous Russian experts and media outlets that “Azerbaijan will betray Russia’s interests in favor of the West.” These predictions turned out to be wrong. During this time, Russia’s traditional historical allies—Georgia, Ukraine, and now Armenia—have shifted towards the West, while Azerbaijan has neither left nor intends to leave anyone or go anywhere. Any attempts to suggest that Azerbaijan has a clear pro-Western stance have proven to be fundamentally mistaken. Azerbaijan has always had, and continues to have, its own independent interests, primarily economic ones. For us, the economy takes precedence over politics, and I believe this is crucial. It would be very desirable for Russia to follow a similar path, to refrain from using force where there is not yet a stable, independent project, where only reactive policies are at play. Force without a coherent project has repeatedly proven its ineffectiveness. Such “force” ultimately tends to serve the interests of other, external players.
In light of the current events in our region, all eyes are now on the territory of Armenia that we refer to as Zangezur (known to Armenians as Syunik), where the Zangezur Corridor or road will be established. The clash of significant interests in this context naturally raises concerns, as there is a risk of Armenia becoming a “bone of contention”, much like Syria. Unfortunately, we are witnessing a process of “Syria-ization” in Armenia, which Azerbaijan and its partners do not want.
Respected speakers have suggested that Azerbaijan could use force to resolve the issue of the Zangezur road, but it has chosen not to do so. I agree with this stance, as Azerbaijan’s goal is not a forceful solution. Instead, the objective is to achieve harmony, stability, and prosperity for the entire South Caucasus region.
For example, our partner Georgia sometimes has mixed feelings about Azerbaijan’s efforts to potentially involve Armenia in these projects, particularly the so-called “Middle Corridor”. This corridor would connect China through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, possibly directly from China, and then transit through the Caspian region into Azerbaijan, continuing through Georgia and potentially Armenia and Iran. From there, it would extend to Turkey and eventually reach Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean. This is an Eurasian project, not an Atlanticist one.